Union Mediation and Adaptation to Reciprocal Loyalty Arrangements

Georgios Panos () and Ioannis Theodossiou

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This study evaluates behavioural differences between union and non-union workers in their preferences regarding reciprocal loyalty in the employment relationship. It uses a vignettes approach to elicit preferences and a novel dataset with unusually rich information on semi-skilled employees from four European countries. It focuses on reciprocal employer-employee arrangements stating that if the employee exerts higher effort, the employer reciprocates by offering higher job security. Such reciprocal arrangements are found to be valued more highly by unionized workers. The evidence suggests that the norm-enhancing role of union membership is the key candidate explanation of this pattern. Union workers are also found more likely to exercise the ‘voice’ rather than the ‘exit’ option in their current job.

Keywords: Trade Union; Loyalty; Reciprocity; Adaptation; Conjoint Analysis; Exit; Voice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J28 J51 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15471/1/MPRA_paper_15471.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Union Mediation and Adaptation to Reciprocal Loyalty Arrangements (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:15471

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().