Financial Intermediation and the Role of Price Discrimination in a Two-Tier Market

Stefan Reitz, Markus Schmidt and Mark Taylor

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Though unambiguously outperforming all other financial markets in terms of liquidity, foreign exchange trading is still performed in opaque and decentralized markets. In particular, the two-tier market structure consisting of a customer segment and an interdealer segment to which only market makers have access gives rise to the possibility of price discrimination. We provide a theoretical foreign exchange pricing model that accounts for market power considerations and analyze a database of the trades of a German market maker and his cross section of end-user customers. We find that the market maker generally exerts low bargaining power vis-á-vis his customers. The dealer earns lower average spreads on trades with financial customers than commercial customers, even though the former are perceived to convey exchange-rate-relevant information. From this perspective, it appears that market makers provide interdealer market liquidity to end-user customers with cross-sectionally differing spreads.

Keywords: foreign exchange; market microstructure; pricing behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ifn, nep-mkt and nep-mst
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Financial intermediation and the role of price discrimination in a two-tier market (2012)
Working Paper: Financial intermediation and the role of price discrimination in a two-tier market (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:15602

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