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Perfect correlated equilibria in stopping games

Yuval Heller

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We prove that every undiscounted multi-player stopping game in discrete time admits an approximate correlated equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium has five appealing properties: (1) “Trembling-hand” perfectness - players do not use non-credible threats; (2) Normal-form correlation - communication is required only before the game starts; (3) Uniformness - it is an approximate equilibrium in any long enough finite-horizon game and in any discounted game with high enough discount factor; (4) Universal correlation device -the device does not depend on the specific parameters of the game. (5) Canonical - the signal each player receives is equivalent to the strategy he plays in equilibrium.

Keywords: stochastic games; stopping games; correlated equilibrium; perfect equilibrium; Ramsey Theorem. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15646/1/MPRA_paper_15646.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17228/1/MPRA_paper_17228.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25891/1/MPRA_paper_25891.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33819/1/MPRA_paper_33819.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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