Model of the 2000 Presidential Election: Instrumenting for Ideology
Jose Fernandez () and
Guido Cataiefe
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
In a spatial model of voting, a voter's utility for a candidate is a function of ideological distance from the candidate and a candidate's quality. Candidate quality can potentially bias the measure of ideological distance in two ways. First, voters may be more drawn to high quality candidates thereby reducing the ideological distance. Second, a candidate's ideological position is a function of rivals�qualities and his own quality. We derive a theoretical model to sign the direction of both biases analytically. Next, using techniques established in the industrial organization literature, we estimate the model using two sets of instrumental variables.
Keywords: spatial voting; discrete choice; instrumental variables (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C35 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:16264
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