Reconsidérer la fonction de PDR: problème urgent au niveau de la zone euro

Rethinking the LOLR function: a new challenge for eurozone

Claudiu Albulescu ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The financial stability can not be achieved without the existence of a lender of last resort. The Bagehot rule is not always appropriate because the complexity of the financial systems increased and because the financial turbulences have nowadays a global impact. In this study we present the recent characteristics of the lender of last resort actions and we focus on the coordination problems arisen in Eurozone in respect of this subject. The European Central Bank has only a coordination role and the interventions of the National Central Banks are constrained by the status of European System of Central Banks. This means that the Eurozone financial systems are not really benefiting from this “safety net”. The set up of a harmonised intervention framework is necessary in order to be effective at Eurozone level.

Keywords: lender of last resort; moral hazard; Eurozone (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F36 G18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12-15, Revised 2008-12-29
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:16583

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