A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting Model

Matej Steinbacher, Matjaz Steinbacher and Mitja Steinbacher

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In the paper, we simulate a heterogeneous-agent version of the wage-posting model as derived by Montgomery (1991) with homogeneous workers and differently-productive employers. Wage policy of particular employer is positively correlated with employer’s productivity level and the wage policy of the competitor. However, it is a less productive employer whose wage posting could also outweigh the posting of a more productive employer, though only temporarily.

Keywords: Job-search model; Wage posting; Heterogeneous agents; Numerical optimization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C15 C78 D83 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-gth and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16706/1/MPRA_paper_16706.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:16706

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter (winter@lmu.de).