Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding

Matthew Pearson and Burkhard Schipper

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we collected information on the female participants' menstrual cycles. We find that women bid significantly higher than men in their menstrual and premenstrual phase but do not bid significantly different in other phases of the menstrual cycle. We suggest an evolutionary hypothesis according to which women are genetically predisposed by hormones to generally behave more riskily during their fertile phase of their menstrual cycle in order to increase the probability of conception, quality of offspring, and genetic variety. Our finding is in contrast to results by Chen, Katuscak and Ozdenoren (2005, 2009).

Keywords: hormones; menstrual cycle; gender; likelihood of conception; first price auction; risk behavior; competition; bidding; endocrinological economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D44 D81 D87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding (2013)
Working Paper: Menstrual Cycle and Competitive Bidding (2012)
Working Paper: Menstrual Cycle and Competitive Bidding (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:16784

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