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Inequality and Authoritarianism in the Developing Countries

Shingo Hamanaka ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This research attempts a theoretical and quantitative analysis of authoritarian regimes enduring in the developing countries. We attempt computer visualization of the model developed by Acemoglu and Robinson in order to derive an empirical hypothesis easily. There is a reason for us to accept the model that they build on the principle of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium. The numerical simulation describes a causal relationship between national income sharing and regime change, and delineates the economic impact of regime transformations. The random effects ordered probit analysis of panel data provides evidence that supports the hypothesis from the simulation. This result contributes to empirical democratization studies because of non adherence to a positive relationship between inequality and democracy among quantitative researches. According to The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, the poor have no incentive for regime transformation and authoritarian regimes are preserved in a state of equilibrium in comparatively equal societies.

Keywords: Dictatorship; Acemoglu and Robinson Model; Democratization; Computer Simulation; Panel Data Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 C35 C73 D58 D72 N45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-11-30
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:16798

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