EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Credit Derivatives and Sovereign Debt Crises

Benedikt Goderis and Wolf Wagner ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Credit derivatives allow for buying protection on corporate debt, but also on sovereign debt. In this paper we examine the implications for sovereign debt crises. We show that the availability of credit protection lowers ex-ante debtor moral hazard by allowing a bondholder to improve his bargaining position in negotiations with the sovereign, thus forcing the sovereign to internalize more of the costs of a crisis. When bondholders use credit protection strategically, we additionally find that credit derivatives do not hinder an efficient resolution of crises. Crisis resolution may even be improved by facilitating conditionality. When protection is not chosen strategically, however, credit protection may also be detrimental to crisis resolution by making restructuring more difficult. In either case we identify a role for government policy as bondholders' choice of protection is not necessarily socially efficient.

Keywords: credit derivatives; sovereign debt crisis; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F33 F34 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-fmk
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17314/1/MPRA_paper_17314.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:17314

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().

 
Page updated 2023-11-11
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17314