Dynamics of intrahousehold bargaining

Joaquin Andaluz, Miriam Marcén and José Alberto Molina

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies the dynamics of bargaining in an intrahousehold context. To explore long-term partner relationships, we analyse bilateral bargaining by considering that spouses take decisions sequentially. We conclude that, for the spouse who takes the second decision, a greater discount factor increases the set of possible sustainable agreements, as well as the proportion of time that this agent devotes to a family good.

Keywords: Family Bargaining; Stackelberg Game; Family Good. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C71 C72 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-lab
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17742/1/MPRA_paper_17742.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamics of Intrahousehold Bargaining (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:17742

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