Alternatives vs. Outcomes: A Note on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is a well-known theorem from the field of social choice theory. It states that every voting scheme with at least 3 possible outcomes is dictatorial or manipulable. Later work on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem frequently does not distinguish between alternatives and outcomes, thereby leading to a less general statement that requires the voting scheme to be onto. We show how the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem can be derived from the seemingly less general formulation.
Keywords: Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; infeasible alternatives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-hpe, nep-lab and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17836/1/MPRA_paper_17836.pdf original version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:17836
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().