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Recirpcity in the shadow of Threat

Raul Caruso ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently a contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture positive investments in ‘conflict management’ - labelled as ‘talks’. It will be demonstrated that the asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake does constitute a powerful force influencing agents’ behaviour. In particular, (a) whenever the asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake is extremely large there is no room for cooperation and a conflict trap emerges; (b) whenever the degree of asymmetry falls within a critical interval cooperation seems to emerge even if only the agent with the higher evaluation of the stake makes a concession, proportional to the optimal choice of ‘talks’; (c) as the evaluations of the stake converge only reciprocal concessions (capturing a kind of strong reciprocity) made by both agents can pave the way for cooperation. In such a case, the existence of reciprocal concessions paves the way for establishing a potential settlement region (PSR) given that both parties can be better off while expending resources in ‘talks’. Finally, throughout the paper, the concept of entropy is applied as a tool for the measurement and evaluation of conflict and conflict management.

Keywords: Conflict; Contest; Conflict management; conflict resolution; concessions; reciprocity; asymmetry in evaluation; Statistical entropy; cooperation; integrative systems; ‘guns’ and ‘talks’ (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1788/1/MPRA_paper_1788.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1804/1/MPRA_paper_1804.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Reciprocity in the shadow of threat (2008) Downloads
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