Contract Enforcement and Family Control of Business: Evidence from China

Yi Lu and Zhigang Tao

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Family control of business is prevalent in developing economies, and one of the leading theories suggests that it is a response to weak contract enforcement in such economies. In this paper, we investigate the impacts of contract enforcement on the degree of family control of business using a sample of China's private enterprises. It is found that weaker contract enforcement is associated with the higher degree of family control of business. Our results are robust to the control for omitted variables and reserve causality issues, to the adjustment for the sample attrition bias, to the use of a sub-sample, and to the inclusion of other explanations for the family control of business.

Keywords: Family Control of Business; Contract Enforcement; China's Private Enterprises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 K12 L22 P37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-law and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18209/1/MPRA_paper_18209.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Contract enforcement and family control of business: Evidence from China (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:18209

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().