Internet auctions with a temporary buyout option

Xiaogang Che

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In an Internet auction, bidders sequentially decide whether or not to enter, and each bidder has to pay a participation cost. In this paper we model an Internet auction with a temporary buyout option. Our main result shows that under certain condition, offering a temporary buyout price would encourage entry of risk neutral bidders, and hence enable the seller to increase expected payoff.

Keywords: Internet auction; temporary buyout option (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06-11
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