Managerial discretion, incentives and governance rules for non-profit organizations

Maria Alessandra Antonelli

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of managerial discretion and some possible solutions in non-profit sector. It is shown how the traditional incentives’ mechanisms are modified in a non-profit setting. In particular, market, reputational and ideological incentives are considered. The analysis highlights that new governance rules are necessary. In this context a new financial model is analyzed where the competition between for-profit and non-profit firms is extended from the products level to that of private financing.

Keywords: non-profit; managerial discretion; incentives, governance rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D23 L30 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Published in Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 1.21(2003): pp. 47-62

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:18849

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