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The evolutionary dynamics of tolerance

Luca Correani, Fabio Di Dio () and Giuseppe Garofalo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper incorporates the phenomenon of tolerance, as the ability to accept diversity, into an economic analysis showing how different aptitudes to trust and cooperation can affect economic outcomes. In the economic system we propose, tolerance is associated with the different weight that agents attribute to their own nature and to the institutional parameters in their utility function. We thus construct a model of overlapping generations, showing that the incentives that influence descendants’ predisposition to tolerance depend on both institutional factors, where behaviour is imposed by rules, and on social (or cultural) factors, found in popular customs and established traditions. Our study highlights the absolute impossibility of affirming tolerance through formal rules. In fact, intolerance is a persistent attitude and its control is only possible through constant and continuous interventions on the educational processes of new generations (intolerance trap).

Keywords: Tolerance; Evolutionary dynamics; Imperfect empathy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 O17 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-neu
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:18989

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