One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences

Ayşe Mumcu and Ismail Saglam

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem that allows for the prospect of being single, and study the existence and properties of stable matchings. We obtain the relationship between the stable set, the core, and the Pareto set, and give a sufficiency result for the existence of the stable set and the core. We also present several findings on the issues of gender optimality, lattices, strategy-proofness, and rationalizability.

Keywords: One-to-one matching; externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1908/1/MPRA_paper_1908.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:1908

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().