Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem

David Ramsey () and Krzysztof Szajowski

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The idea of this paper was presented at Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, International Conference in Memory of Jerzy Łoś (1920 - 1998), Warsaw, September 2004. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian, republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equilibria selection are used.

Keywords: correlated equilibria; Nash equilibria; non-zero sum game; secretary problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C68 C7 D58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-09, Revised 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19870/2/MPRA_paper_19870.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:19870

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().