Micro-microcrédit et asymétries d’information: cas du Maroc

INFORMATION asymmetries and microcredit: The Moroccan case

Abdelhamid El Bouhadi and Essardi Omar

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we apply the Principal/Agent theory in case of microcredit granted to the Moroccan micro-companies. The practice reveals us that a part of the receipted credits is diverted from its initial objective. Indeed, a situation of information asymmetries linked with adverse selection and moral hazard can be noticed. Given that the Agent behavior (the debtor) is unobservable, the Principal (the Creditor) cannot select every time the good types of Agents.

Keywords: Microfinance; Microcredit Institutions; Moroccan Micro-companies; Adverse Selection; Moral Hazard; Principal/Agent Theory; Information Asymmetries. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G21 G28 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-05-15
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:20080

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