Estado mínimo, agencias de protección y control territorial

Minimum State, control agencies and Territorial protection

Fernando Estrada

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This article exposes key aspects for the theoretical analysis of the political reality in Colombia in moments of severe derived social uncertainty of the conflict and the fork of serious dilemmas on the institutional order that comes from political campaigns influenced decisively by the paramilitary interests and the intimidating blockade of insurgent groupings and of the organized violence. We present a joint analysis on the dynamics of political power at local level, from borrowed tools of the contemporary political philosophy. In particular from concepts and taken categories of Robert's work Nozick: Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). The article understands three analytic units: (1) A description of the protection agencies (2) A model nozickiano of stocks singular low protection agencies (3) An empiric reading of the conflict from MN (the model Nozick). The hypothesis that I will put on approval it is that the analytic defi nition given by Nozick on the minimum State has its own applied metamorphosis to the Colombian case; especially, if we liberate the characteristics that he gives to the emergence of the State, understandingly and we interpret the assimilation that Nozick carries out between Minimum State and Agencies of dominant protection. The basic argument that I sustain will have an indirect relationship with the strategic extension of the groupings that dispute the local political power.

Keywords: Colombia; General Economics; Game Theory; Quantitative Methods; Welfare Economics; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A1 B4 C7 D7 D74 G0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-11-10, Revised 2010-01-20
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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