Choosing the scope of trade secret law when secrets complement patents

Elisabetta Ottoz and Franco Cugno

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We present a model where an incumbent firm has a proprietary product whose technology consists of at least two components, one of which is patented while the other is kept secret. At the patent expiration date, an entrant firm will enter the market on the same technological footing as the incumbent if it is successful in duplicating, at certain costs, the secret component of the incumbent’s technology. Otherwise, it will enter the market with a production cost disadvantage. We show that under some conditions a broad scope of trade secret law is socially beneficial despite the innovator is over-rewarded.

Keywords: knowledge spillovers; duplication costs; covenants not to compete; inevitable disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20672/1/MPRA_paper_20672.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27195/1/MPRA_paper_27195.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Choosing the scope of trade secret law when secrets complement patents (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:20672

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter (winter@lmu.de).