Corporate Lobbying and Financial Performance

Hui Chen, David Parsley and Ya-wen Yang

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators and thus to further company goals by encouraging favorable policies and/or outcomes. Using data made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, this study examines corporate lobbying activities from a financial perspective. We find that on average, lobbying is positively related to accounting and market measures of financial performance. These results are robust across a number of empirical specifications and continue to hold when we account for potential sample selection. We also report market performance evidence using a portfolio approach. We find that portfolios of firms with the highest lobbying intensities significantly outperform their benchmarks in the three years following portfolio formation.

Keywords: Corporate Lobbying; accounting performance; market returns; portfolio (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-ban, nep-bec, nep-cfn, nep-eff and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:21114

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