Resale price maintenance: Explaining the controversy, and small steps towards a more nuanced policy

Matthew Bennett, Amelia Fletcher, Emanuele Giovannetti and David Stallibrass

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper sets out why we consider that the legal framework in the EU amplifies what are in reality relatively small differences in thinking around RPM. Primarily, this is because it asks economists, in the name of legal certainty, to draw a false dichotomy between agreements and practices which are harmful and those which are beneficial. We then provide a summary of the literature on RPM and, based on this thinking, set out a few small steps that might be taken towards a more nuanced approach to assessing RPM, within a 'presumed illegality' framework without sacrificing the beneficial legal certainty that the current approach brings.

Keywords: Competition Policy; RPM; Resale Price Maintenance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 K21 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:21121

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