Market Institutions: An Expository Essay

Nirvikar Singh

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This essay provides an elementary, unified introduction to the models of market institutions that go beyond the competitive model of price-taking behavior on both sides of the market. Several models of market institutions that govern price determination are explored and compared, including contracting, posted prices, bilateral bargaining, middlemen, and auctions. While equilibrium models still do not capture the full possibilities for market behavior, modeling specific market institutions reduces the level of abstraction inherent in the standard competitive model.

Keywords: market institutions; contracting; posted prices; bilateral bargaining; middlemen; auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: MARKET INSTITUTIONS: AN EXPOSITORY ESSAY (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:21559

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