Sequential play and cartel stability in a Cournot oligopoly

Sergio Currarini () and Marco Marini

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We reconsider the problem of cartel stability in a linear symmetric Cournot oligopoly by assuming that every coalition of firms defecting from a cartel can choose its quantity before the remaining firms. We show that differently from Salant et al. (1983) the only profitable cartel includes all firms in the industry. This result is shown to be robust to non linearities in payffs provided that the inverse demand function is not too log-concave.

Keywords: Cartel Stability; Cournot Oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 L10 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05
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