Об одной модели перераспределения ресурсов

A Model of Resource Redistribution

Victor Polterovich
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Виктор Меерович Полтерович

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Consider an economy with n resources (goods) and m agents, and let initial resource allocation be given. We ask if it is possible to build a mutually beneficial bargaining sequence that approaches an optimal resource allocation even though a) only k ≤ n agents participates at each step of the bargaining sequence, and b) they use only information about participants of the exchange. We answer this question using a new concept of quasi - summator functions. In particular, the answer is positive if k > n and all agent utility functions are concave.

Keywords: bargain (exchange); resource redistribution (reallocation); Khelli's Theorem; deadlock point; quasi-summator function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1970
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Economics and Mathematical Methods / Ekonomika i matematicheskie metody 4.6(1970): pp. 583-593

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