Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale

Regulation of a duopoly and environmental R&D

Slim Ben Youssef and Zeineb Dinar

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We develop a three stage game model composed of a regulator and two firms. These firms compete on the same market where they offer the same homogeneous good, and can invest in R&D to lower their emission/output ratio. By means of a tax per-unit of pollution and a subsidy per-unit of R&D level, the regulator can induce the first best outcome.

Keywords: Duopole; Taxe d'émission; Subvention de R&D; Optimum de premier ordre. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 H21 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05, Revised 2010-04
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22385/1/MPRA_paper_22385.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:22385

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