Wise exploitation – a game with a higher productivity than cooperation – transforms biological productivity into economic productivity

Thomas Friedrich

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: I suggest a new game called wise exploitation. It is characterized by a small investment of the exploiting party to either breed the exploited party or educate the exploited party not to detect exploitation. Thereby a higher productivity than cooperation or prisoners´ dilemma is achieved. The higher productivity is a benefit for the group and one party on the cost of the other. To stabilize this an important marginal condition has to be met: the investment (breeding, education) must be overcompensated by the gain. In the light of this suggestion mutualism or symbiotic associations of genetically non related organisms, like leafcutter ants with their fungus or human groups should be reinvestigated.

Keywords: wise exploitation; productive exploitation; consumptive exploitation; avoided exploitation; prisoners´ dilemma; tolerated exploitation; costing exploitation; cost efficient exploitation; breeding; farming; culture; civilization; education; hope; suffering; gain; cost; loss; mass and energy conservation; leafcutter ants; fix cost; variable cost; production function; enzyme kinetics; Michalelis Menten; saturation curve; productivity; forced exploitation; forced mutualism; substrate; brute force; fear; honesty; signaling; cooperation; Nash equilibrium; mutation; invade; reward; stability; predator; prey; self sustaining; emotions; arms race (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 J13 Q10 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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