Private and public incentive to reduce seasonality: a simple theoretical model
Roberto Cellini and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper presents a theoretical model to investigate the incentive of private producer and policy-maker to reduce seasonality in a given market, where consumers derive different utilities from the consumption of the good in different seasons. The (seasonal) product differentiation is modeled along the lines of the contributions of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982). We take into consideration that investments are possible to reduce the degree of seasonality. We show that, for a wide set of parameter configuration, the policy maker finds it optimal to make more effort to reduce seasonality as compared to private producers. The theoretical conclusion is consistent with empirical and anecdotical evidence, especially in the field of tourism markets.
Keywords: Seasonality; Tourism; Public Spending (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D29 L12 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-tur
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23588/1/MPRA_paper_23588.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23898/1/MPRA_paper_23898.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:23588
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().