Agricultural Extension and Imperfect Supervision in Contract Farming: Evidence from Madagascar

Marc Bellemare

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This article tests whether agricultural extension and imperfect supervision -- conflated here into the number of visits by a technical assistant -- increase productivity in a sample of contract farming arrangements between a processing �rm and small agricultural producers in Madagascar. Production functions are estimated which treat the number of visits by a technical assistant as an input and which exploit the variation in the number of visits between the contracted crops grown on a given plot by a speci�c grower, thereby accounting for district-, grower-, and plot-level unobserved heterogeneity. Results indicate that the elasticity of yield with respect to the number of visits lies between 1.3 and 1.7.

Keywords: Supervision; Extension; Contract Farming; Grower-Processor Contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L24 O13 O14 Q12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-agr
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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Journal Article: Agricultural extension and imperfect supervision in contract farming: evidence from Madagascar (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:23788

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