Payment Card Systems as an Example of two-sided Markets - a Challenge for Antitrust Authorities

Katarzyna Tosza

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This article aims to present the concept of two-sided markets on the example of payment card systems, which have attracted the attention of regulatory and antitrust authorities in recent years. First, the paper offers a few insights into the basic economic theory behind two-sided markets. Second, it presents a brief description of payment card systems and their features. The following analysis focuses on arguments that speak in favour of a regulatory or antitrust intervention into payment card systems. Finally, some of the potential problems that antitrust authorities must face when assessing two-sided markets are presented on the basis of an assessment of the decisional practice of the UOKiK President and the European Commission.

Keywords: two-sided markets; antitrust v. regulation; interchange fees; payment card systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Published in Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 2(2).2009(2009): pp. 125-140

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:23822

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