Quantity Competition, Endogenous Motives and Behavioral Heterogeneity

Alessandra Chirco (), Caterina Colombo () and Marcella Scrimitore

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper shows that strategic quantity competition can be characterized by behavioral heterogeneity, once competing firms are allowed in a pre-market stage to optimally choose the behavioral rule they will follow in their strategic choice of quantities. In particular, partitions of the population of identical firms in profit maximizers and relative profit maximizers turn out to be deviation-proof equilibria, both in simultaneous and sequential game structures. Our findings that in a strategic framework heterogeneous behavioral rules are consistent with individual incentives provides a game-theoretic microfoundation of heterogeneity.

Keywords: Behavioral Heterogeneity; Endogenous Motives; Relative Performance; Multistage Games; Quantity Competition. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cse, nep-evo, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Quantity competition, endogenous motives and behavioral heterogeneity (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:24165

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