Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in an almost symmetric oligopoly

Massimo De Francesco () and Neri Salvadori

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We analyze a Bertrand-Edgeworth game in homogeneous product industry, under effcient rationing, constant marginal cost until full capacity utilization, and identical technology across firms. We solve for the equilibrium and establish its uniqueness for capacity configurations in the mixed strategy region of the capacity space such that the capacities of the largest and smallest firm are sufficiently close.

Keywords: Bertrand-Edgeworth competition; mixed strategy equilibrium; almost symmetric oligopoly; Mixed strategy equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition in an Almost Symmetric Oligopoly (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:24228

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