EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Incentives from Exchange Rate Regimes in an Institutional Context

Ashima Goyal

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: An open economy macromodel, calibrated to typical institutions and shocks of a populous emerging market economy, shows that a monetary stimulus preceding a supply shock can abort inflation at minimum output cost, since of the appreciation of exchange rates, accompanying a fall in interest rates and rise in output. Analytic results obtained for two periods are generalized through simulations and validated through estimation. One instrument achieves both domestic output and exchange rate objectives, partly since it creates correct incentives for foreign exchange traders. Strategic interactions imply supporting institutions are required to coordinate monetary, fiscal policy, and markets to the optimal equilibrium.

Keywords: Emerging Market Economy; Mundell-Fleming; Monetary Policy; FX Market; Supply Shocks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F31 F41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in Journal of Quantitative Economics 1 and 2.6(2008): pp. 101-121

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24310/1/MPRA_paper_24310.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Incentives from Exchange Rate Regimes in an Institutional Context (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Incentives from exchange rate regimes in an institutional context (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Incentives from exchange rate regimes in an institutional context (2005) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:24310

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:24310