Task-Specific Abilities in Multi-Task Agency Relations
Veikko Thiele
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
This paper analyzes a multi-task agency framework where the agent exhibits task-specific abilities. Besides investigating the appendant consequences of applying incongruent performance measures in incentive contracts, this paper demonstrates how the provision of incentives - including the optimal aggregation of information - takes the agent's task-specific abilities into consideration. It further emphasizes the relation between job characteristics and the principal's preference for selecting specific agents. This paper essentially demonstrates that differences in task-specific abilities across agents can provide a supplementary explanation of why they are allocated to various jobs; or why they receive different incentive contracts, even if their jobs are identical.
Keywords: Task-specific human capital; performance measurement; distortion; multi-task agencies; congruence; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D82 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2470/1/MPRA_paper_2470.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7403/1/MPRA_paper_7403.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7404/2/MPRA_paper_7404.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:2470
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