Enforcement and over-compliance

Jay Shimshack and Michael Ward

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Economists generally view environmental enforcement as a tool to secure compliance with regulations. This paper demonstrates that credible enforcement significantly increases statutory over-compliance with regulations as well. We find that many plants with discharges typically below legally permitted levels reduce discharges further when regulators issue fines, even on other plants. Also, non-compliant plants often respond to sanctions by reducing discharges well beyond reductions required by law. Thus, increased enforcement generates substantial discharge reductions above and beyond those expected from simply deterring violations.

Keywords: Over-compliance; Fines; Compliance; Enforcement; Regulation; Pollution Policy; Environmental economics; Environmental enforcement; Water pollution; Beyond compliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 Q53 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 55.1(2008): pp. 90-105

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Related works:
Journal Article: Enforcement and over-compliance (2008)
Working Paper: Enforcement and Over-Compliance (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:25993

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