Networks, law, and the paradox of cooperation

Bryan Caplan (bcaplan@gmu.edu) and Edward Stringham

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: There is a tension between libertarians’ optimism about private supply of public goods and skepticism of the viability of voluntary collusion (Cowen 1992, Cowen and Sutter 1999). Playing off this asymmetry, Cowen (1992) advances the novel argument that the “free market in defense services” favored by anarcho-capitalists is a network industry where collusion is especially feasible. The current article dissolves Cowen’s asymmetry, showing that he fails to distinguish between self-enforcing and non-self-enforcing interaction. Case study evidence on network behavior before and after antitrust supports our analysis. Furthermore, libertarians’ joint beliefs on public goods and collusion are, contrary to Cowen and Sutter (1999), theoretically defensible.

Keywords: networks; anarcho-Capitalism; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 L13 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published in Review of Austrian Economics 4.16(2003): pp. 309-326

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Related works:
Journal Article: Networks, Law, and the Paradox of Cooperation (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:26086

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