Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey
Benjamin Powell and
Edward Stringham
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
Public choice economists began studying the economics of anarchy in the 1970s. Since then, the amount of research on anarchy has burgeoned. This article surveys the important public choice contributions to the economics of anarchy. Following the lead of the early public choice economists, many current economists are researching and analyzing how individuals interact without government. From their non-ublic-interested explanations of the creation of government law enforcement to their historical studies of attempts to internalize externalities under anarchy, public choice scholars are arriving at a more realistic perspective on government and how people interact when government law enforcement is lacking. Although the economics of politics often receives more attention, the economics of anarchy is an important area of research in public choice.
Keywords: anarchism; lawlessness; order; internalization of externalities; self-governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (104)
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26097/1/MPRA_paper_26097.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey (2009) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:26097
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().