Effect of Monetary Incentives on Institutional Deliveries: Evidence from the Janani Suraksha Yojna in India

Ambrish Dongre

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper is the first attempt to rigorously evaluate the short term effects of the `Janani Suraksha Yojna' (Safe Motherhood Scheme), a nationwide conditional cash transfer program in India, launched in April 2005. Under the scheme, a woman delivering her child in a medical facility is provided monetary rewards. My difference-in-difference results indicate that in the initial one and a half years of its operation, the scheme did not have any effect on the disparity between the targeted and non-targeted states. In fact, the gap widened in this period, albeit marginally. But beginning from 2007, the targeted states have shown much larger improvements in the institutional deliveries, leading to a dramatic decline in the gap between the targeted and the non-targeted states. I also show that the convergence or differential improvement in access and availability of medical facilities are not driving my results.

Keywords: Janani Suraksha Yojna; Cash Transfer Program in India; Institutional Deliveries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08-27
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26339/1/MPRA_paper_26339.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:26339

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().