International Economic Sanctions Are Not Zero-Sum Games: There Are Only Losers

Kamran Dadkhah and Hamid Zangeneh

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Ostensibly, the US sanctions have been enacted to bring pressure on Iran to abandon her support of terrorism and subversion of the region, efforts to produce weapons of mass destruction, and opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process. But it is said that domestic politics, particularly, the 1996 presidential elections and the power struggle over foreign policy between the Congress and the President may have resulted in adopting the harsh measures. In this paper we argue that embargoes and sanctions outlined above are detrimental to the United State’s leadership and harm American economic interests, and in all likelihood, they will not change Iran’s behavior.

Keywords: Iranian economy; Iranian Economic, US Sanctions; cost of sanctions; Benefits of sanctions; Effectiveness of Sanctions; D’Amato law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F5 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998, Revised 1998
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Iranian Journal of Trade Studies Quarterly 5.1(1998): pp. 1-14

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