Leverage and trade unionism in Indian industry: An empirical note

Saibal Ghosh

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Market power in the hands of a supplier- such as a labor union - affects an industry’s capital structure. Using panel data techniques for 1992-2004, this note shows that industries indeed appear to employ financial leverage strategically to influence collective bargaining decisions. The estimates imply that strategic incentives from input markets have a substantial impact on financing decisions

Keywords: capital structure; collective bargaining; trade unionism; inventories india (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07
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Published in Indian Journal of Industrial Relations 2.46(2010): pp. 194-200

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