Coopetitive game solutions for the eurozone economy

David Carfì (), M. Magaudda and Daniele Schiliro'

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper aims at providing, through a game theory model of coopetition, feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective to the problems that affect the Eurozone economy after the Greek crisis. In particular, it focuses on stability and growth as the primary goals, which should drive the Eurozone economy in consequence of the financial and economic crisis of the Greek economy with its effects throughout the Euro area. By means of two coopetitive models derived by an original general analytical framework of coopetition, we show in our paper the strategies that could bring to feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective between Germany and Greece, where these feasible solutions aim at “sharing the pie fairly”, by offering a win-win outcome for both countries, within a growth path represented by a non-zero sum game. A remarkable analytical result of the paper consists in the determination of the winwin solution by a new selection method on the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the coopetitive game.

Keywords: Eurozone Economy; Coopetition; Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 F40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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