The Bayesian Solution and Hierarchies of Beliefs

Qianfeng Tang ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The Bayesian solution is a notion of correlated equilibrium proposed by Forges (1993), and hierarchies of beliefs over conditional beliefs are introduced by Ely and Pęski (2006) in their study of interim rationalizability. We study the connection between the two concepts. We say that two type spaces are equivalent if they represent the same set of hierarchies of beliefs over conditional beliefs. We show that the correlation embedded in equivalent type spaces can be characterized by partially correlating devices, which send correlated signals to players in a belief invariant way. Since such correlating devices also implement the Bayesian solution, we establish that the Bayesian solution is invariant across equivalent type spaces.

Keywords: Games with incomplete information; Correlated equilibrium; The Bayesian solution; Common knowledge; Hierarchies of beliefs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26811/1/MPRA_paper_26811.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26902/2/MPRA_paper_26902.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:26811

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().