Nash Equilibrium and Robust Stability in Dynamic Games: A Small-Gain Perspective
Zhong-Ping Jiang and
George Athanasiou ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper develops a novel methodology to study robust stability properties of Nash equilibrium points in dynamic games. Small-gain techniques in modern mathematical control theory are used for the first time to derive conditions guaranteeing uniqueness and global asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium point for economic models described by functional difference equations. Specification to a Cournot oligopoly game is studied in detail to demonstrate the power of the proposed methodology.
Keywords: Dynamic game; Cournot oligopoly; Nash equilibrium; Robust stability; Small gain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C0 C02 C61 C62 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01-07, Revised 2010-09-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Published in Computers and Mathematics with Applications 11.60(2010): pp. 2936-2952
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:26890
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