Network Formation with Adaptive Agents

Stephan Schuster ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, a reinforcement learning version of the connections game first analysed by Jackson and Wolinsky is presented and compared with benchmark results of fully informed and rational players. Using an agent-based simulation approach, the main nding is that the pattern of reinforcement learning process is similar, but does not fully converge to the benchmark results. Before these optimal results can be discovered in a learning process, agents often get locked in a state of random switching or early lock-in.

Keywords: agent-based computational economics; strategic network formation; network games; reinforcement learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cmp, nep-cse, nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:27388

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