Patience, cognitive skill and coordination in the repeated stag hunt
Omar Al-Ubaydli,
Garett Jones and
Jaap Weel
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
Coordination games have become a critical tool of analysis in fields such as development and institutional economics. Understanding behavior in coordination games is an important step towards understanding the differing success of teams, firms and nations. This paper investigates the relationship between personal attributes (cognitive ability, risk-aversion, patience) and behavior and outcomes in coordination games, an issue that, to the best of our knowledge, has never been studied before. For the repeated coordination game that we consider, we find that: (1) cognitive ability has no bearing on any aspect of behavior or outcomes; (2) pairs of players who are more patient are more likely to coordinate well and earn higher payoffs; and (3) risk-aversion has no bearing on any aspect of behavior or outcomes. These results are robust to controlling for personality traits and demographic characteristics.
Keywords: Coordination; IQ; personality; discount rate; patience; risk-aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D23 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-neu
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27723/1/MPRA_paper_27723.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Patience, Cognitive Skill and Coordination in the Repeated Stag Hunt (2011) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:27723
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