The Nash Equilibrium requires strong cooperation

Elemer Elad Rosinger

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Contrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games, it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong cooperation assumption. Furthermore, in practice, this cooperation assumption is simply unrealistic.

Keywords: non-cooperation; strong cooperation; mixup in the Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 C62 C71 C72 D5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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