 Cicli politici elettorali ed evoluzione del finanziamento della sanità italiana: uno studio di lungo periodoPolitical Electoral Cycles and Evolution of Italian Health Care System Financing: a Long Run PerspectiveMPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Abstract: The aim of the paper is the explanation of the instability of the financing rules embracing the political-electoral cycles approach. A demonstration of the two following assertions is presented: - when Local Governments (Regions) are the sole manager of the HCS' expenditure, the increase of HCS' expenditure represents a political tool for the incumbent (a signaling towards the voters in the electoral period); - given the signaling strategy of Regions during the electoral period , Central Government is induced to decrease the ordinary financing from one hand, and to bail out (ex post financing) from the other hand. An empirical analysis of the two theoretical results is presented, concluding that the expectations on the regional elections can explain the HCS' bailing out (Italy 1981-2005). Only a better division of the responsibilities about the HCS' financing between Central Government and Regions can reduce the instability that political-electoral cycles introduce in the NHCS' financing. Keywords: Cicli politici elettorali; Spesa Pubblica; Sistema sanitario nazionale; Ripiano dei disavanzi; Rapporti Stato-Regioni; Economia Italiana (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:28009 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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