Donor fragmentation

Stephen Knack and Aminur Rahman

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This chapter explains the incentives facing donors that lead them to fragment their foreign aid effortis over a large number of recipients, sectros, and projects. It summarizes cross-country evidence suggesting that fragmentation may reduce quality of the public administration in aid recipients, distort public expenditure allocations, and impair progress on public budgetary management reform efforts.

Keywords: foreign aid; public administration; collective action failures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 F35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Reinventing Foreign Aid (2008): pp. 333-348

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:28043

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