A tale of three countries, dispersed ownership and greater risk taking levels by management: risk monitoring tools in bank regulation and supervision – developments since the collapse of Barings Plc (re – visited)

Marianne Ojo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper is aimed at explaining why higher concentrations of the ownership of large firms do not necessarily and automatically facilitate lower risk taking levels – where there is scope for the abuse of powers. As well as illustrating why effective corporate governance systems are essential in facilitating high levels of monitoring, accountability and disclosure, the paper also highlights why a consideration of the costs of ownership concentration and its benefits, is required in determining whether corporate governance systems will be effective or not.

Keywords: corporate governance; ownership structures; banks; risk; regulation; monitoring; disclosure; accountability; liquidity; internal controls (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 G01 G2 G3 K2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-reg and nep-rmg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:28131

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